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RETROACTIVITY -Though Subsequent Case Found Price
Affirmation Statutes Unconstitutional, Prior Opinion
Would Be Applied: Stroh Brewery Co. v. Director of the
New Mexico Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Stroh Brewery Co. v. Director of the New Mexico Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control,' the New Mexico Supreme Court found that
its prior ruling which confirmed a price affirmation statute was constitutional and was the controlling law of the case, and that a subsequent
United States Supreme Court opinion invalidating all price affirmation
statutes did not have a retroactive effect. Stroh Brewery, therefore, was
required to pay damages to the Director of the Department of Alcoholic2
Beverage Control ("Director") pursuant to a preliminary injunction bond.
The court further determined that a retroactive application of the United
States Supreme Court holding in Healy v. Beer Institute ("Healy II")l
to the Stroh case would not promote any purpose of the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution. Singling out one brewer by applying Healy
II retroactively would be inequitable and subject the state of New Mexico
to liability. 4 This Note examines price affirmation laws and the theory
of retroactivity as discussed in the Stroh case, as well as its negative
implications on the law of New Mexico. 5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1979, Stroh's predecessor6 sought declaratory and injunctive relief
based on its belief that a price affirmation requirement of the 1979
Discrimination in Selling Act 7 ("1979 Act") violated the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution.8 The trial court temporarily enjoined
II.

1. 112 N.M. 468, 816 P.2d 1090 (1991).
2. Id.
3. 491 U.S. 324 (1989) [hereinafter "Healy I'].
4. Stroh, 112 N.M. 468, 816 P.2d 1090.
5. The U.S. Supreme Court effectively overruled Stroh in Harper v. Va. Dept. of Taxation,
No. 91-794 (June 18, 1993) (LEXIS, Genfed library). In Harper, which was decided as this Note
went to print, the Court said that its interpretation of federal law "is the controlling interpretation
and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events,
regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of this rule." Id. at 8.
The Harper court adopted a position similar to that of Justice Montgomery's dissent in Stroh.
6. Stroh Brewery Company, along with other brewers, joined the action in United States Brewer's
Ass'n v. Director of N.M. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 100 N.M. 216, 668 P.2d 1093
(1983). By the time of the 1984 appeal to the United States Supreme Court, United States Brewers
Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 465 U.S. 1093 (1984), Stroh Brewery acquired the United States Brewer's
Association assets and~was substituted as plaintiff-appellant in the appeal before the New Mexico
Supreme Court.
7. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-12-1 to -10 (1978), repealed by 1981 N.M. Laws ch. 39, § 128.
8. Stroh, 112 N.M. at 469, 816 P.2d at 1091.
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the Director from enforcing the law, requiring Stroh's predecessor to
execute a bond agreeing to pay the difference in the price at which it
would have sold its beer under the statute and the amount at which it
did, with interest, if the statute was later found to be valid. 9 In 1980,
the court granted summary judgement in favor of the Director, upholding
the constitutionality of the 1979 law by relying on Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons v. Hostetter.'0 Stroh's predecessor appealed the summary judgement. While the appeal was pending, the New Mexico Legislature repealed
the 1979 Act" and enacted a newer 1981 Act. 12 The 1979 Act required
that liquor prices to wholesalers in New Mexico during any month be
no higher than the lowest price sold to any wholesaler in any other state
in the previous month. The 1981 Act eliminated the previous month
affirmation requirement for a simultaneous one; the supplier had to attest
that the price in New Mexico was no higher than that being charged at
that moment anywhere else in the country. 3
On July 21, 1983, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's summary judgment in United States Brewer's Association v. Director of N.M. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control finding that
the trial court correctly applied the Seagram holding. 14 Stroh, now substituted as plaintiff-appellant in the action, appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, but the action was dismissed.' 5 On June 14, 1985, the
legislature amended the 1981 Act to exclude beer from the price affirmation requirement. 16 The damage liability period applicable to Stroh
therefore ran from June 15, 1979, to February 21, 1985.17
While United States Brewer's Association was on remand, the United
States Supreme Court overruled Seagram, finding all price affirmation
statutes unconstitutional. 8 The parties both moved again for summary
judgement. Stroh argued that the 1979 law was now invalid and Stroh
therefore had no obligation under the bond. The Director argued that
the New Mexico Supreme Court decision which upheld the 1979 law was
the law of the case and the Director was entitled to damages from 1979
to 1985.19 The trial court granted summary judgement in favor of the
Director, and Stroh appealed to the New Mexico Supreme Court. 20 The
Supreme Court held that the decisions regarding retroactivity recently
clarified in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia2 1 did not apply to

9. Id.
10. 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
11. 1981 N.M. Laws ch. 39, § 128.
12. Id. §§ 1-130.
13. Stroh, 112 N.M. at 469, 816 P.2d at 1091.
14. United States Brewer's Ass'n v. Director of N.M. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 100
N.M. at 220-21, 668 P.2d at 1097-98 (1983).
15. Stroh, 112 N.M. at 470, 816 P.2d at 1092.
16. 1985 N.M. Laws ch. 5, §§ 1-5. "
17. Stroh, 112 N.M. at 470, 816 P.2d at 1092.
18. Healy II, 491 U.S. at 343.
19. Stroh, 112 N.M. at 470-71, 816 P.2d at 1092-93.
20. Id. at 471, 816 P.2d at 1093.
21. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
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this case. It instead affirmed that the applicable law was that of United
22
States Brewer's Association, and upheld the summary judgement.
III.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF PRICE AFFIRMATION LAWS
AND RETROACTIVITY

Price Affirmation Laws
Following the fall of prohibition with the twenty-first amendment,
states were able to determine the circumstances by which alcohol was
sold to retailers and consumers within the state. 23 The majority of states
eventually regulated wholesale liquor prices, requiring that suppliers guarantee that their prices in that state were at least as low as prices in any
other state.24 The United States Supreme Court found that such price
affirmation laws were2 constitutional on their face in Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons v. Hostetter.
The price affirmation portion of the applicable 1979 and 1981 Acts
required that an alcohol distributor file an affirmation as to the comparative price at which he sold alcohol in New Mexico versus other
states.26 Stroh's predecessor in litigation argued that this requirement
violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, and brought the initial
action in this matter.2 7 The trial court relied on the decision in Seagram,
initially granting summary judgement for the Director.2 The United States
Supreme Court, however, subsequently found all price affirmation statutes
unconstitutional in Healy II, giving rise to the problem addressed by the
Stroh court.
Seagram had upheld New York's retroactive price affirmation law. 29
In July 1983, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the trial court
correctly applied the Seagram decision. 0 In the six years following the
United States Brewer's Association decision, the United States Supreme
Court decided three important cases which potentially affected Stroh's
position. First, in Healy v. United States Brewer's Association,3 the
United States Supreme Court upheld a decision invalidating a Connecticut
price affirmation statute which required distributors to file price affirmations at the beginning of every month. 3 2 Second, in Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority,33 though dealing
A.

22. Stroh, 112 N.M. at 474, 816 P.2d at 1096.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, §§ 1-2.
24. Thomas E. Rutledge, The Questionable Viability of the Des Moines Warranty in Light of
Brown-Forman Corp. v. New York, 78 Ky. L.J. 209, 210 (1990).
25. 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
26. Stroh, 112 N.M. at 469, 816 P.2d at 1091.
27. See supra note 6.
28. Stroh, 112 N.M. at 469, 816 P.2d at 1091.
29. United States Brewer's Ass'n, 100 N.M. at 220-21, 668 P.2d at 1097-98.
30. Id.
31. 464 U.S. 909 (1983) [hereinafter "Healy r'].
32. Id.
33. 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
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with a "prospective" act,34 the Supreme Court indicated that all price
affirmation statutes would be invalid." This indication was made explicit
in the third and most crucial case, Healy II. In Healy II, the United
States Supreme Court expressly overruled Seagram and declared all price
affirmation statutes unconstitutional.16 Thus, the applicability of these
recent decisions to the Stroh case arose.
B.

Retroactivity
The New Mexico Supreme Court found no guidance within Healy II
indicating that the decision was to be applied retroactively; therefore,
the court decided the question of retroactivity for itself.3 7 Though the
New Mexico Supreme Court considered the question of retroactivity in
Lopez v. Maez,3 s it applied federal retroactivity standards to the Stroh
case. 39 The Stroh case relied heavily on a United States Supreme Court
case, Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.4°
In Chevron, the United States Supreme Court specifically set out the
following three factors to determine whether a decision should be given
retroactive effect: 1) Does the decision establish a new principle of law
by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants relied, or an issue
of first impression which was not foreshadowed; 2) Would retroactive
application advance the purpose of the rule; and 3) Would an inequity
41
be imposed on the parties if the law were applied retroactively.
In Chevron, the respondent had reasonably relied on previous decisions,
and therefore the United States Supreme Court found that retroactive
application of a superseding case would be unfair. 42 The Stroh court
used the Chevron test to determine whether Healy II should be applied
retroactively.43 The court determined that because Healy H established a
new principle of law, 44 retroactive application would not advance any

price affirmation at
to file
34. The Brown-Foreman case dealt with a statute requiring a seller
the beginning of each calendar month; the court considered this to be "prospective" in nature.
Stroh, 112 N.M. at 470, 816 P.2d at 1092 n.7.
35. The Court wrote: "Forcing a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State before
undertaking a transaction in another directly regulates interstate commerce." Brown-Foreman, 476
U.S. at 580 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935)).
36. Healy II, 491 U.S. at 343.
37. Stroh, 112 N.M. at 471, 816 P.2d at 1093.
38. 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982).
39. Stroh, 112 N.M. at 471, 816 P.2d at 1093. Lopez determined that ifthe application of a
"new law imposes significant new duties and conditions and takes away previously existing rights,
then the law should be applied prospectively." Lopez, 98 N.M. at 632, 651 P.2d at 1276. The rule
in Lopez was held to be prospective because it would impose significant liabilities on those who
felt they had been following the law. Id. The Lopez case created a new duty when the breach of
an existing duty (i.e., selling alcohol to an intoxicated person) was the proximate cause of a plaintiff's
injury. Id.
40. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
41. Id. at 106.
42. Id. at 107.
43. Stroh, 112 N.M. at 472, 816 P.2d at 1094.
44. Id.
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purpose of the Commerce Clause, 45 and such application would produce
inequitable results and subject the State of New Mexico to liability."
The New Mexico Supreme Court, however, chose to ignore the retroactive implications of the recent United States Supreme Court case,
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia ("Beam"). 47 Beam held that
a prior ruling invalidating a tax scheme similar to that of the New Mexico
Acts would be applied retroactively to a claim whose facts antedated its
decision." The court in Beam determined that the law in Bacchus Imports,
Ltd. v. Dias"9 should be applied retroactively, allowing an out of state
manufacturer of bourbon to receive a refund for taxes paid under a
statute invalidated by the Bacchus decision.5 0 Significantly, the Beam
decision does not rely on the Chevron test, finding the issue of retroactive
application to be clear. 5' Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, concluded that a rule of law applied to litigants in one case must be applied
52
to all others not barred by procedural requirements or res judicata.
Justice White, concurring, maintained that there was no precedent for
applying a new rule only to the parties of the case, and should not be
allowed on the basis of stare decisis.53 Justice Blackmun, with whom
Justice Marshall and Justice Scalia concurred, felt that not applying a
"newly declared constitutional rule to cases pending on direct review
violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication. 5' 4 The majority in
Stroh, along with the concurring opinion, took special care to emphasize
that Beam was inapplicable to that case.55
IV.

ANALYSIS OF STROH

The Chevron Test
Applying the first prong of the Chevron test, the New Mexico Supreme
Court found that Healy II invalidated all price affirmation statutes as
unconstitutional, and therefore established a new principle of law.5 6 In
making the determination whether the second prong of the test was
fulfilled, the court looked to the practical effects of the retroactive
application of Healy II.57 The court reasoned that the damage" of applying

A.

45. Id. at 473, 816 P.2d at 1095.
46. Id. at 473-74, 816 P.2d at 1095-96.
47. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
48. Id. at 2441.
49. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
50. See Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2446.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2448-49.
54. Id. at 2449.
55. Stroh Brewery Co. v. Director of the N.M. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 112 N.M.
468, 474, 816 P.2d 1090, 1096 (1991).
56. Id. at 472, 816 P.2d at 1094.
57. Id. at 473, 816 P.2d at 1095.
58. The court defined the damage as the balkanization of states against brewers attempting to
sell their products in interstate commerce, and the "price gridlock" of one state interfering with
another state's pricing laws. Id.
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the rule in Seagram would not be alleviated nor prevented in the future
by applying Healy II retroactively. 9 This reasoning is not as obvious as
with the prior prong. The court further felt that allowing Stroh the
benefit of a retroactive application of Healy II would be unfair to other
brewers who complied with the 1979 Act. 60 Additionally, the Director
might be accused of unfair dealing with respect to other brewers, subjecting
the state of New Mexico to liability. 6' The New Mexico Supreme Court
therefore found that based on the Chevron test, Healy II should not 62be
given retroactive effect, and affirmed the trial court's determination.
It is interesting to note, however, that in Chevron the respondent's
injuries occurred three years prior to the decision in question. 63 The
Chevron respondent could not reasonably have foreseen the change in
law." Conversely, the Stroh Brewery continuously believed that the price
affirmation law was unconstitutional, a belief that became justified when
the Supreme Court invalidated all such laws in Healy II. The Stroh court
could have decided the case differently and applied Healy II retroactively
because Stroh expected the change in law and thus met the requirement
65
of Chevron's first prong.
As to the second prong of the test, the Commerce Clause forbids such
price affirmation statutes as expressed in Healy II.66 It also seems that
the retroactive application of the decision would essentially have no effect
on furthering or retarding its operation. Thus, the Healy II decision
arguably does not meet the second prong of the Chevron test.
The third prong of the Chevron test deals with the potentially inequitable
results to a party of retroactive application of a law. The Stroh court
particularly seems to have misapplied this prong. In actuality, inequitable
results seem to have arisen with the non-retroactive application of the
Healy II decision. Stroh suffered, being penalized for its ultimately correct
constitutional belief, while the Director gained "damages" pursuant to
the injunctive bond he would not otherwise have been able to collect by
the provisions of the 1979 and 1981 Acts. 67 Furthermore, the wholesalers
who intervened in the Stroh action benefitted from the decision at Stroh's
expense, receiving money from the injunction bond they would not have
been entitled to collect without joining this lawsuit.6 The concern of the
Stroh majority that retroactive application of the Healy II doctrine would
subject the State of New Mexico to liability to other brewers who complied
with the provisions of the Acts 69 may or may not be of real concern.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 474, 816 P.2d at 1096.
Id.
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105 (1971).
Id. at 107.
Stroh, 112 N.M. at 481, 816 P.2d at 1103 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 477, 816 P.2d at 1099 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 474. 816 P.2d at 1096.
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Those parties voluntarily settled with the Director,70 and would never
have had to pay anything close to the $18 million in damages Stroh
owed because of its injunctive bond.
B. Applicability of James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia
The majority of the court further found that the recent United States7
Supreme Court decision in Beam was inapplicable to the Stroh case. '
In a special concurrence with the decision, Justice Franchini asserted that
Beam is inapplicable because the factual situation is distinct. 72 Franchini
distinguished Beam from Stroh for two reasons: First, nothing in Healy
II indicates that it should be applied retroactively. Second, Beam's assertion that the law should be applied to all similar litigants unless barred
by procedural requirements or res judicata 7a does not apply because Stroh74
had been subject to the United States Brewer's Association decision,
which was the controlling law of this case. Despite the Beam Court's
Franchini continues to consider
rejection of the Chevron test, 75 Justice
76
the test valid as applied to this case.
Justice Montgomery, however, in his dissent, pointed out that decisions
interpreting the Constitution are generally given retroactive effect, 77 and
the Beam decision requires a result other than the one reached by the
majority. Six of nine justices in the Beam decision determined that the
Bacchus decision should be applied retroactively, with two justices determining they must promote fairness to similar litigants and maintain
the principle of stare decisis, while three78 others felt all constitutional
decisions should be applied retroactively.
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF STROH

The New Mexico Supreme Court has apparently determined that it will
uphold the law of the case doctrine in all situations, regardless of the
circumstances. This is unfortunate because the doctrine of retroactivity
is crucial in upholding the integrity of the judicial system. As Justice
Blackmun expressed in Beam, "because it forces us to consider the
disruption that our new decisional rules cause, retroactivity combines
with stare decisis to prevent us from altering the law each time the
opportunity presents itself. ' ' 79 Certainly, the New Mexico Supreme Court
seems to have destroyed the retroactivity doctrine as it is applied against

70. Id. at 482, 816 P.2d at 1104 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 474, 816 P.2d at 1096.
72. See id. at 475, 816 P.2d at 1097.
73. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2446.
74. United States Brewer's Ass'n v. Director of N.M. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 100
N.M. 216, 668 P.2d 1093 (1983).
75. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2446.
76. Stroh, 112 N.M. at 475, 816 P.2d at 1097.
77. Id. at 480, 816 P.2d at 1102 (Montgomery, J.,dissenting) (referring to Beam at 2443).
78. Id.
79. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2450.
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the state because of its fear that the state might incur liability for not
having enforced previously applicable laws. Justice Montgomery in his
dissent does not believe the state could incur liability where brewers settled
their potential liability with the state to avoid continued litigation. 0 A
settlement where the state had no authority to collect money except via
an injunction bond would not "give rise to liability on the part of the
8
state or otherwise result in inequitable consequences to other parties." '
The other brewers may have waived their right to sue by not previously
challenging the law because they could have joined Stroh in its suit.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Stroh court held that their prior ruling was the law of the case,
and the Stroh company had to pay approximately $18 million in damages
to the Director of the New Mexico Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control on their injunction bond. The court found that the United States
Supreme Court decision in Healy II should not be applied retroactively.
Furthermore, the court felt that the State of New Mexico could be held
liable to the other brewers who followed the original law. Those brewers
settled their liability with the state, however, and the distributors who
joined in action with the Director suffered no damage. The results may
be considered unjust, and in the future, litigants may be wary of bringing
a case against the state on constitutional issues they feel secure will be
overturned.
ANNE-KATHRYN CLAASSEN

80. Stroh, 112 N.M. at 482, 816 P.2d at 1104 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
81. Id.

